Abstract: Targeted sanctions originated as a more refined tactic in response to humanitarian concerns over the unintended consequences connected to comprehensive trade embargo sanctions. Extending targeted sanctions to include terrorism produced further unintended consequences, in particular the faulty identification of sanction targets. This paper looks at one specific case of targeted sanctions against the financing of terrorism in order to study the position of the European Union at the United Nations Security Council. The listing of the Somali money transfer firm al Barakaat raised a number of issues involving the use of sanctions against non-state actors. It also provoked a legal challenge against the EU's implementation of these targeted sanctions, which in turn has been portrayed as a challenge to the use of targeted sanctions by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. This paper considers first the development of targeted sanctions, then EU Presidency statements at the United Nations concerning terrorism followed by a brief summary of the al Barakaat case, which motivated a number of changes in the sanctions process. Following the discussion is an assessment of the damage incurred from the misidentification of al Barakaat as a source of terrorist financing and several concluding thoughts on the location of the EU in the use of sanctions against terrorism. The central point here is the same as that frequently stated by the EU Presidency, that targeted sanctions must ensue from due process and the rule of law, whatever the venue, in order to protect human rights.
forums that suggests speaking with a single voice may actually reduce European influence at the United Nations as compared to the influence possible from a chorus of multiple Member States' voices. (Smith, 2006: 133) Nonetheless, multiple voices speaking in chorus remain ineffectual in the context of Security Council decision-making, which is often a product of consensus because of the veto option available to the Permanent Five. Absent any foreseeable reform of the United Nations and Security Council, any analysis of UN sanctions in the financial war on terror must continue to focus on the actions of individual state members in the framework of their various multilateral institutional affiliations.
Back in Brussels, however, the Commission does function at times as if it was a participating member in its own right of the UN when, for example, it implements a Community action in response to a Security Council Resolution. This action is consistent with the exclusive competence of the EC in external trade matters, which includes economic and financial sanctions. The legal precedent confirming this competence is contained in a number of European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions. (Lavranos, 2006: 473; Ketvel, 2006) The imposition of sanctions by the EU in this fashion has been challenged and for the case of sanctions against the financing of terrorism several of those named in Europe took the Council and the Commission before the Court in protest of the imposition of economic sanctions, asserting that they were innocent of the accusations. Due to the targeted nature of Security Council-mandated sanctions against named persons in these circumstances, the European Union no longer appears to uphold the human rights of its individual citizens.
Rather it seems to have become another layer of abstraction between the individual and the external agency infringing those rights. As described by Nikolaos Lavranos, the standard legal relationship in a EU Member State between a UN Resolution and national implementation now has an additional layer of legality inserted, such that the relationship is in the form 'UN sanctions-EC/EU law-national law'. (Lavranos, 2006: 472) The nature of UN sanctions against terrorist financing forced an individual Member State (Sweden) to step around Brussels in order to act directly on behalf of its residents/citizens as well as to lobby for modifications to the Resolution and the methods established to monitor and update the associated sanctions list. (Cramér, 2003) In this relationship, the individual cannot seek legal remedy from the state, because national courts may not act on EU/EC legislation, and the individual has no presence before the Security Council. (Vlcek, 2006: 503 -504 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (encompassing all sanctions resolutions) are binding on member states, but they are also often observed in the breach, and their language frequently leaves ample room for interpretation.' (Myers, 2002: 17) An important aspect of the efforts to reform UN sanction regimes concerns the problem of national implementation in order to improve global effectiveness and compliance of sanction regimes. Significantly, the UN possesses few, if any, capabilities to punish the non-compliant, whereas the Commission has the option to bring a reluctant EU Member State before the European Court.
(de Vries and Hazelzet, 2005: 101) To accomplish the goals desired from this paper, it is structured in four sections and closes with some concluding remarks concerning the use of targeted sanctions in the war on terror.
The next section lays out the use of targeted sanctions as a method of international political control and the application of targeted sanctions against terrorism. Then the paper situates the European Union within the public image of the Security Council, recognising that most Security Council work takes place in private meetings and informal gatherings. The third section introduces the specific case of the financial sanctions imposed by the Security Council on al Barakaat and its named principals as an example of a target for financial sanctions in the war on terror, which was then contested in the European Courts. In the fourth section is an analysis of the reaction to this representative legal challenge and with it the entire structure of 'targeted sanctions'. This will permit some conclusions to be drawn concerning the consequences that arise from the presence of the EU as a layer of bureaucracy between national governments and the universal international organisations of the United Nations system in the contested equation of liberty versus security.
Targeting sanctions
The subtitle of a 2005 edited collection surveying the contemporary usage of international sanctions captures the essence of the objectives for imposing sanctions -'between words and wars in the global system'. (Wallensteen and Staibano, 2005) 2 The ultimate purpose of a sanction, whether imposed by a single state or by a collection of like-minded states, is to accomplish a foreign policy goal. 3 The belief is that sanctions demonstrate a firmness of resolve to force a change in the policies, actions or conduct of another state or its governing elite, but as a demonstration that falls short of using military action to force or manufacture the change. Thus, the imposition of economic sanctions by the United Nations against This shift reflects the difficulties experienced with past attempts to impose a full embargo on trade, while permitting legitimate humanitarian aid to pass through and monitoring for any sanction-busting activity. (Staibano, 2005) A number of initiatives since the late 1990s have sought to clarify and improve the process as 'targeted' sanctions in order to avoid the humanitarian concerns arising from comprehensive trade embargoes. At the same time these initiatives also seek to improve the efficacy of this tool for international peace and security. however, demonstrated the futility of sanctions when they are simply ignored by the target.
In this situation the leverage of sanctions was limited and the state of affairs remained unchanged until the Taliban were forcibly removed from power at the end of 2001. In this instance at least, the move from sanctions to war in the global system was possible as there was a state entity against which the United Nations could take action. (2000) reiterated the demands of the previous Resolution while extending the sanctions regime to freeze the financial assets of bin Laden, his associates and any entities associated with him, including the al Qaida organisation. 6 With this short introduction to sanctions, the paper moves in the next section to a search for the location of the European Union at the Security Council in the formulation and maintenance of these Resolutions constructing the financial front of the global war on terror.
The EU and the UNSC
Any attempt to make a claim for EU action at/in the UN Security Council is inherently problematic, first because the EU is not a member. The European members of the Security Council find themselves with conflicting interests and desires in the context of decisionmaking in the pursuit of international peace and security. (Hill, 2006) The second problem is the fact that substantive and critical debate over security issues occur in camera, leaving the researcher with hints, innuendo and anonymous tips that may suggest or imply a particular viewpoint or opinion behind any decision or action. And as with the first point, public statements by any individual state member of the Security Council are intended for a multitude of audiences, domestic and international. Consequently, following the methodology suggested by Robert Kissack, the official EU viewpoint will be taken (found) from(in) the public statements made at the UN with respect to the very specific issue of sanctions and the financial war on terror. (Kissack, 2007) As may be seen in the table below, these statements are a subset of a large and varied set of official statements made at the UN by the EU Presidency. (Farrell, 2006: 35) What we have in this situation is the participation of actors without a presence. By this I mean the subject of a UN targeted sanctions regime is not permitted a presence in the context of UN decision-making practices because these persons (natural or legal) are not recognised in the practices of inter-state organisations. Similarly, the supra-national entity that is the European Union (Commission and Council) has a transparent existence within the United Nations system. In some instances, the Food and Agriculture Organization for example, the European Community is a recognised member speaking and acting on behalf of its component Member States while they maintain an independent membership. Whereas there are other UN organisations in which the EU possesses less of a presence, participating as an 'observer' of events and decisions while its Member States speak and act. And finally, the EU becomes diaphanous in UN organisations such as that under analysis here, the Security Council; present in the meeting room, invited at times to speak, the EU has no official seat, 
Hitting the wrong target -al Barakaat
There has been a number of cases contesting the actions of the EU/EC and its implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions against the financing of terrorism lodged at the Court of First Instance.
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The plaintiffs' legal teams have taken several different approaches to construct their challenge against the imposition of sanctions, however, subsequent to the judgements issued in Cases T-306/01 and T-315/01, the Court has seen fit to refer back to the logic of its decision in these two initial cases (see for example §86 -91, §103 -156 in the Judgement for Case T-253/02). Consequently, attention must be given to the Judgements issued in these cases as effectively setting the judicial precedent. Perhaps more important is the fact that the plaintiffs in T-306/01 were vindicated outside the boundaries of the European Court of Justice in that the accusations made against al Barakaat as a conduit of terrorist financing by the US government were unfounded, as documented by the 9/11 Commission in the Monograph on Terrorist Financing appended to the Commission's published report. (Roth et al., 2004) The Somali firm of al Barakaat has been identified variously as a money-wiring service, a money exchange, and a telecommunications service provider (as part of a diversification/expansion strategy bringing mobile phone service to the residents of Somalia).
Prior to the anti-terrorism action directed by the United Nations Security Council, it was one of the largest firms in Somalia. (Kaufman, 2001) The US government announced on 7
November 2001 In the end, none of those connected with al Barakaat in the US were charged with terrorism.
The most that officials were able to accomplish with the evidence available was to convict one Somali with operating an unlicensed money transfer firm in Boston, and the two Somalis operating the al Barakaat office near Washington, D.C. pled guilty to one count of 'conspiracy to structure transactions to avoid reporting requirements', which is an anti-money laundering charge. (Jackman, 2002) In the climate of the times and with the desires of government officials to be seen as 'taking action' against terrorism, charges were levelled at The objective for 'targeted' sanctions is to avoid the collateral damage that resulted from broad trade embargoes, nonetheless they may still affect more than simply the parties identified by name on a sanctions list. In this particular case, the customers of al "The al-Barakaat closure is having a very, very serious effect," said Randolph Kent, the United Nations humanitarian representative in Somalia. "We are at a point where we have to start anticipating a crisis that could be unique in the modern state system -the collapse of an entire national economy." (Kaufman, 2001: A30) Discounting for journalistic hyperbole one could make the case that the Somali economy had already effectively collapsed and one result was the opportunity for al Barakaat and other conclusions that Swedish public opinion considered the legitimacy of Security Council decision-making processes to be damaged due to its treatment of these three Swedish citizens.
Similarly, the General Counsel to the Swedish Mission at the UN wrote that 'the very credibility of the United Nations was questioned.' (Miller, 2003: 48) In fact, a charity was created to support them in their efforts to get their names removed from the sanctions list, an action which is also in violation of UN/EU sanctions and which state prosecutors declined to prosecute because of the large number of small donations received making any prosecution Formally blocking access to bank accounts does little good if significant support is provided 'cash in hand' by members of the public. (Cooper, 2002) 15
Damage assessment
In assessing the consequences that result, first from the Security Council's attempt to impose preventative sanctions against terrorism and second from the legal challenges made against the EU's implementation of these sanctions several points must be kept in mind. First is the evolving nature of the financial war on terror. The initial Security Council Resolution (1267) did not include provisions to correct mistakes (implying that 'false positives' were not expected or a minor concern), a problem that later was corrected in response to the pressure of Sweden and other states due to the mistake made with al Barakaat. Similarly, the total ban report's analysis and recommendations for improvements to the sanctions process is to 'reduce the risk of judicial decisions that could complicate efforts to promote international peace and security. ' (p. 3) The focus of the White Paper is then to improve the sanctions process in order to prevent judicial constraints on Security Council action against terrorism, rather than to improve the process in order to maintain compliance with human rights norms.
It is thus simply another iteration of the 'liberty-security balance' debate, with preferential treatment afforded to the security side. analysed elsewhere to varying degrees of conclusion. (Ley, 2007; Ketvel, 2006; Lavranos, 2006; Pech, 2006; Tomuschat, 2006; Vlcek, 2006; Tappeiner, 2005; Andersson et al., 2003) Rather the issue at hand is the reaction to the court cases by the various parties that support or criticise the Security Council on its use of targeted sanctions in the war on terror. This reaction involved both a question of United Nations Security Council obligations to uphold human rights norms in its activities, initiatives and directives when pursuing international peace and security; and what may be read as indignation at the very idea that a national juridical agent could, even indirectly and obliquely, challenge the decisions of the Security Council on matters of international peace and security. At issue is whether or not anyone occupies a position (or is qualified) to contest the judgement of the Security Council, acting in the best interests of the international community, to identify and condemn threats to international peace and security and to direct its member states to take the necessary measures to isolate and eliminate the threats identified. The specific question here is whether EU actions at the Security Council moderate or ameliorate Security Council initiatives in an effort to forestall future contestations over targeted sanctions in light of the legal challenges that have been made within the EU against them. A definitive answer to this question is not apparent from the public record of EU statements at the Security Council.
The assumption that the Security Council is infallible in its determination of what constitutes a threat to peace and security seems rather presumptuous and tactfully forgets the politics behind the process of designating a threat. In a contribution critiquing claims that the Security Council is failing to meet human rights obligations, particularly with regards to targeted sanctions, Jose E. Alvarez insisted that the determination of the extent and range of any human rights obligation rests solely and completely within the bounds of the Security Council itself, as determined and agreed to by the signatories of the UN Charter. (Alvarez, 2003: 125 -129) He acknowledged that the Security Council's 'actions with respect to international human rights and international humanitarian law are problematic and selective' while at the same time insisting that to question those actions or to propose corrective measures to them rather serves potentially to 'undermine the legitimacy or effectiveness of one of the few effective tools that we have for responding rapidly to human rights crises as well as for the progressive transformation of the law of human rights.' (Alvarez, 2003: 123) In this focus on the human rights aspects of the challenges made against the use of targeted sanctions to counter terrorism and the activities of non-state actors, Alvarez appears to lose sight of the fact that the determinations and judgements of the Security Council are political. danger confronting international peace and security. In fact, the designation of terrorism as a threat to international peace and security is itself an extension of the original intentions for the Security Council in the United Nations Charter. (Bianchi, 2006: 885 -892) Consequently, when there are events or actors that fail to be designated a threat-by-consensus in this fashion, how legitimate can we find any designation made by the Security Council that a specific event or activity represents a threat to international peace and security? In other words, just because the Security Council determined in the heated tense atmosphere of New York City in the aftermath of the al Qaida attack on the World Trade Center that those who finance terrorism are a threat to international peace and security, must we also accept without question the specific designation of any person (natural or legal) to be a financier of terrorism?
Preliminary conclusions
It would be easy to suggest that this study of EU activity in the confines of the Security
Council represents yet another case of substantive differences in policy approach between the EU and the US. (Rees, 2006) To take such a view, however, would be far too simplistic for clearly the European states fully support the sanctions. At the same time, a number of Member States are motivated to improve the operation of targeted sanctions as demonstrated by the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm Processes. This factor suggests a shared belief that targeted sanctions are a useful foreign policy tool, even against the non-state actors engaged in terrorism. Nor is it a matter of a difference in the perceived level of relative concern with human rights norms or humanitarian action as again, these Processes were in part endeavours to establish more humane approaches to the operation of sanctions as a technique operating 'between words and wars' than had been the case with broad trade embargoes against an entire state and its population. On the other hand, there were US representatives at the UN that expressed their concern in Security Council meetings that while some states were willing but lacked the capacity to implement and enforce these sanctions regimes, there were other states that were capable yet remained unwilling. The belief on the part of any 'state in question' concerning human rights obligations is more than just a specific concern for the individual welfare of the person listed or their family. It also reflects a concern with the nature of the process that resulted in the listing of the individual and the absence of transparency in that process to observers outside the chambers of the Security Council. (Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, 2007: 16 -17) This concern has been expressed in the statements of the EU Presidency which frequently restate the official view that the sanctions process 'must be firmly based on due process and the rule of law. ' (European Union Presidency, 2006) For 'effective multilateralism' to occur there must be consensus not only on goals and objectives, but also methods and tactics. Foremost amongst these should be due process and rule of law as a foundation for conduct consistent with human rights norms. The approach taken to achieve the goal of international peace and security requires the active support of all participants in the multilateral process and especially so when the threat is subject to disagreements over basic aspects, like the definition of terrorism. The worry that active support is lacking on the part of some developed states in particular against the 'scourge of terrorism' remains embedded in the attitude taken that to question the application/utility of smart sanctions is also to question the ultimate goal for imposing sanctions in the first instance. However, the insistence on due process and rule of law in the practices and procedures of the UN Security Council should be seen as no different from insisting that domestic (national) methods and tactics against terrorism are also subject to due process and the rule of law. The fact that al Barakaat was the wrong target for financial sanctions underscores at the very least the need for due process in evaluating the evidence and assessing its accuracy before proceeding with the addition of any person to the sanctions list.
As demonstrated by the controversies surrounding the case of al Barakaat a change was required in the UN sanctions regime against terrorism and the financing of terrorism. The EU as a political entity did not accomplish the change, but rather it was the active engagement of EU Member States, continuing to operate as independent sovereign states, that brought about improvements. This set of circumstances is quite understandable given that the core institutions of the United Nations, and most especially the Security Council, remain stateoriented. As noted above, the EU Presidency made appropriate statements at the Security
Council, yet those statements did not always receive the public endorsement and support of all the EU members contributing remarks at a Security Council meeting. Confronted by the remote disciplinary conduct of the Security Council against the financing of terrorism, the fundamental issue remains the protection of human rights juxtaposed against the insatiable demands of the fearful seeking security from the unknown terrorist threat. against Cuba for example) and they may be used as 'signalling' in order to demonstrate leadership or to support international standards. (Drezner, 1999: 10 -18) In the context of the sanctions introduced against the financing of terrorism in 2001, it must be agreed that US initiatives were just as much about signalling action to its domestic audience as it was a means of taking action against terrorism. See for example (Warde, 2007: vii -xi; Taylor, 2007: 6 -12 investments. (Milbank and Day, 2001: 1) 12 Marieke de Goede is citing (Golden, 2002) .
13 Professor Taylor's recounting of the al Barakaat episode is brief and apparently unaware of the wider consequences of the sanctions. 'When the 9/11 Commission reviewed the AlBarakaat case two years later, they found that the evidence of ties to al-Qaeda was not as clear-cut as we had thought and I had indicated in my press briefing.' (Taylor, 2007: 22) 14 Andersson, et. al. (2003) point out that when the Court of First Instance accepted Swedish government assurances that these payments were sufficient to cover the basic needs of the plaintiffs while the legal process was underway, the Court essentially was accepting as well the fact that these payments violated the EC law that was challenged by this court (Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, 2007: 25 -26) 16 The official US government position is very similar-'It is important to recognise that these delisting actions not only demonstrated an appropriate consideration of the rights of designated parties, but they also validated the effectiveness of designations as a tool in our overall efforts to combat terrorist financing.' (United States Mission to the United Nations,
2005)
17 See for example (Donohue, 2005; Meisels, 2005; Waldron, 2003; Hardin, 2004) . 18 The initial directions provided by Resolution 1267 concerning exceptions simply stated 'except as may be authorized by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need' (Article 4(b) ). Resolution 1452 provides more a detailed and structured approach to exceptions and also was encouraged by the increased concern for human rights observance in the financial sanctions process. 
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